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Comment
State Net Income Taxes
and Interstate Commerce:
Interstate Commerce Tax Exemption Act
As the first step toward a solution of the problem of state taxation
of interstate commerce, Congress enacted Public Law 86-272, "An
Act relating to the power of the States to impose net income taxes
on income derived from interstate commerce. ,, Title I of the
act provides in part: 2
(a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose
. a net income tax 3 on the income derived within such State by any
person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within such
State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable year are either, or
both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders 4 by such person, or his representative, in
such State for sales of tangible personal property 5 which orders are sent
outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by
shipment or delivery from a point outside the State; and
1. Section 101(a), 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws, 613-14
(1959)). All references herein to the taxing power of the states will also refer to
the taxing power of the political subdivisions of the states which the act likewise
restricts.
2. Section 102 of Title I of the act also provides:
(a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to assess,
after the date of the enactment of this Act [September 14, 1959], any net in-
come tax which was imposed by such State or political subdivision, as the case
may be, for any taxable year ending on or before such date, on the income
derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce, if the im-
position of such tax for a taxable year ending after such date is prohibited by
section 101.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not be construed -
(1) to invalidate the collection, on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act, of any net income tax imposed for a taxable year ending on or before
such date, or
(2) to prohibit the collection, after the date of the enactment of this Act, of
any net income tax which was assessed on or before such date for a taxable
year ending on or before such date.
Section 102, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nws, 614 (1959)).
3. "For purposes of this title, the term 'net income tax' means any tax imposed on,
or measured by, net income." Section 103, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, 614 (1959)).
4. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this term and
the problems that may arise in its interpretation and application.
5. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this term
and the problems that may arise in its interpretation and application.
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(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in
such State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of
such person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable such
customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders described
in paragraph (1).6
The act also provides an exemption from state net income taxation
for a person or company otherwise within the act's exemption, if a
sale is made or an order solicited for such a person or company by
an independent contractor.7 However, the act does not in any event
6. Section 101(a), 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws, 613
(1959)). The purpose of subsection (2) is to permit the salesmen of a manufac-
turer to solicit orders from retail customers for the benefit of a wholesale dealer.
See note 18 infra for an example of this type of activity by the Brown-Forman
Company.
As finally enacted, § 101(a) of the act generally incorporates the language of
S. 2524, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), as submitted to the Senate by the Senate
Finance Committee, but with one major exception. The original bill included a
paragraph which provided:
(3) the maintenance and operation by such person, or his representative, in
such State of an office the primary purpose of which is to serve representatives
of such person who are engaged in the solicitation of orders described in para-
graph (1) or (2), or both, and to receive, process, and forward such orders.
105 CONG. Rr. 14994 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959).
The purpose of this paragraph was specifically to overrule the decision of the
Supreme Court in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959). Paragraph (3) would have allowed an interstate business to maintain
office facilities to assist its salesmen in the solicitation of orders without being sub-
ject to state net income taxation. See S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959),
quoted in U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws, 2549-51, 2553-54 (detailed description of
bill) and 2556-57 (minority views) (1959).
Senator Byrd of Virginia, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, summed
up the proposed purposes of the bill as follows:
Unless immediate action is taken at this time, it is feared that the States will
amend their laws to further encroach upon interstate commerce as a result of
the Supreme Court decisions in February of this year [Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), decided with Wil-
liams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc.] . . . . The bill is designed to pre-
vent this by definitely overruling the February 1959 decisions.
105 CONG. REc. 14990 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959). See also 105 CONG. BFEe. 15020-
21 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959) for debates by the Senate on the Kerr amendment
which was intended to substitute the word "sole" for "primary in referring to the
purpose of the office allowed by paragraph (3). This amendment was adopted by
the Senate the following day, see 105 CONG. EEc. 15099 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959).
However, paragraph (3) of the original bill, as amended by the Kerr amendment,
was completely deleted by the Talmadge amendment and the exemption allowed
by the original bill was narrowed. As Senator Talmadge stated:
What I am seeking to do is to preserve the entire body of decisions relating
to the collection of income taxes which have been in existence for 30 years be-
fore the decisions in the Stockham Valves and Portland Cement cases were
ever handed down.
105 CONG. Pose. 15101 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959). See 105 CONG. REc. 15101-05 &
15107 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959) for the Senate debates on the Talmadge amend-
ment. The Talmadge amendment was adopted by the Senate, 105 CONG. REC. 15107
(daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959).
7.
(c) For purposes of subsection (a), a person shall not be considered to have
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exempt from state net income taxes a corporation which is incorpo-
rated under the laws of the taxing state or an individual who is dom-
iciled in or a resident of that state.8 In addition, Title II of the act
provides for a comprehensive study by congressional committees of
state income taxation of interstate businesses. These committees are
engaged in business activities within a State during any taxable year merely
by reason of sales in such State, or the solicitation of orders for sales in such
State, of tangible personal property on behalf of such person by one or more
independent contractors or by reason of the maintenance of an office in such
State by one or more independent contractors whose activities on behalf of such
person in such State consist solely of making sales, or soliciting orders for sales,
of tangible personal property.
Section 101(c), 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 613 (1959)).
For purposes of this section -
(1) the term 'independent contractor' means a commission agent, broker, or
other independent contractor who is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders
for the sale of tangible personal property for more than one principal and who
holds himself out as such in the regular course of his business activities; and
(2) the term 'representative' does not include an independent contractor.
Section 101(d), 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 613-14
(1959)).
Thus, the exemption of the act allows a broader range of tax free activities by an
independent contractor than by a sales representative. The independent contractor
is permitted to make sales as well as solicit orders, and hence, can render services to
customers. This exemption could be used by a company to accomplish the same ends
that the act precludes- the maintenance of an office and the provision of services
to customers -merely by using a different means. This was pointed out by Senator
Core who stated:
An independent contractor, who could represent a company having a vast
spread of business, could represent some other small concern for a minutia of
business and thereby qualify as an independent contractor. The company could
have as many of these men as it desired within a State, taking orders and selling
and delivering goods, and yet avoid State income taxes.
105 CONG. PEc. 15123 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959).
Senator Core also pointed out that, although an independent contractor could be
taxed by the state, it might be possible for a large corporation to maintain a sub-
sidiary within a state to act as an independent contractor. The parent company
could so manage the business of the subsidiary that the subsidiary would show little
profit and the parent company would accomplish considerable savings. 105 CONG.
REc. 15125 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959).
However, Senator Byrd of Virginia expressly stated that the exemption of an of-
fice of the independent contractor does not include the maintenance of an office by
the out-of-state company or its representatives, and this is apparently intended to
prevent the use of subsidiaries as independent contractors. See 105 CoNG. EE.
15125 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959). See also S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.(1959), quoted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 2554 (1959).
8.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to the imposition of a
net income tax by any State, or political subdivision thereof, with respect to-
(1) any corporation which is incorporated under the laws of such State; or
(2) any individual who, under the laws of such State, is domiciled in, or a
resident of, such State.
Section 101(b), 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs, 613 (1959)).
Thus, a corporation may be taxed by the state in which it is incorporated, even
though the corporation otherwise fulfills all of the acts requirements for exemption
in that state.
9.
The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
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to recommend to Congress proposed legislation to establish uniform
standards for states imposing income taxes on interstate commerce.
Thus, Title I of the act is intended as a stop-gap measure until the
study-group provided for by Title II submits an adequate solution
to the entire problem of heterogeneous state taxation of interstate
commerce.
The new act is unique in that it is the first congressional action
designed to resolve the growing conflict between the vital interests
of the states in financing their activities and the national interest in
promoting interstate business for a more prosperous industrial econ-
omy.10 The act attempts to resolve this conflict by defining limits to
state taxing power and by assigning to congressional committees the
task of drafting uniform standards for state taxation of interstate
commerce. Previously, the task of delimiting the state power to tax
interstate business had been assumed by the Supreme Court.1 Prior
Committee on Finance of the United States Senate, acting separately or jointly,
or both, or any duly authorized subcommittees thereof, shall make full and
complete studies of all matters pertaining to the taxation by the States of in-
come derived within the States from the conduct of business activities which
are exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce or which are a part of
interstate commerce, for the purpose of recommending to Congress proposed
legislation providing uniform standards to be observed by the States in imposing
income taxes on income so derived.
Section 201, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws, 614 (1959)).
As originally introduced, S. 2524, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), made no provision
for a study of the entire problem of state taxation of interstate commerce. However,
Senator Frear introduced a lengthy amendment which proposed to establish a
"Hoover-type commission" to make an exhaustive study of the problems and to
recommend legislation to Congress no later than March 31, 1962. With minor altera-
tions, the Frear amendment was adopted by the Senate. See 105 CONG. REC. 15020
(daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959). See also 105 CONG. Ec. 15000-01, 15012-13 & 15017
(daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959), for the Senate debates on the Frear amendment.
However, the Frear amendment was rejected by the House of Representatives in
favor of an amendment by Representative Walters. This amendment, as adopted,
was substantially the same as Title II of the act as passed by Congress. See 105
CONG. REc. 15541 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1959). The conference committee which met
to resolve the differences in the Senate and House proposals stated that they con-
cluded that the study should be made by congressional committees. See CONG. REP.
No. 1103, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), quoted in U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws,
2560 (1959). See also 105 CoNG. REc. 16096-97 (daily ed. Sept. 1, 1959), and 105
CONG. Ec. 16348 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
10. See Pierce, State Fiscal Needs and Interstate Commerce, 18 Omo ST. L.J. 48,
44-49 (1957) (state fiscal problems); Tr FEDERa=.rT No. 11, at 79-80 (Hamilton),
No. 23, at 94-95 (Hamilton), No. 42, at 183 (Madison) (BEaRD, Trm E DuRiNG
FEDERALIST) (1948) (national interest in interstate commerce).
11. See generally HIATm , STATE TAXATION OF ImEtsTATE CommERcE (1953);
Anderson, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 1952 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1 (1952);
Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade, 53 HAav. L. REv. 1253 (1940);
Strecker, "Local Incidents" of Interstate Business, 18 OMxO ST. L.J. 69 (1957); 4
MINN. L. REv. 1010 (1959); 43 MN N. L. REv. 1015 (1959).
The entire history of the judicial process was described by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), as follows:
The power of the States to tax and the limitations upon that power imposed
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to its decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Min-
nesota,2 the Supreme Court permitted "indirect, non-discrimina-
tory" 13 and "apportioned"'41 taxes to be levied only on the local or
intrastate activities of an interstate business.'- In Northwestern Ce.
by the Commerce Clause have necessitated a long, continuous process of
judicial adjustment.
The history of this problem is spread over hundreds of volumes of our
Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would
neither clarify what had gone before nor guide the future.
Id. at 251-52.
12. 858 U.S. 450 (1959), decided together with Williams v. Stockham Valves &
Fittings, Inc. In the Northwestern Cement case the Supreme Court affirmed the
state court's decision that an interstate business which maintained a leased sales
office, five salesmen and a secretary in the taxing state was subject to an apportioned
state net income tax. See State v. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co., 250
Minn. 82, 38, 84 N.W.2d 378, 378 (1957). In Stockham Valves the Supreme Court
reversed the state court's decision that an interstate business which maintained a
sales-service office occupied by one salesman and a secretary was not subject to an
apportioned state net income tax. See Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc. v. Williams,
213 Ga. 713, 716-17, 101 S.E.2d 197, 199 (1957).
13. A discussion of the terms "indirect" and "non-discriminatory" is quite beyond
the scope of this Comment. An examination of the cases attempting to define these
term reveals that there is no universal definition adopted by the courts. However, for
cases holding that the commerce clause prohibits states from laying direct burdens
on interstate commerce, see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946); McLeod
v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 822 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1944); Adam Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U.S. 307, 311-312 (1938); Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S.
326, 386 (1887); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 458 (1959) (dictum); Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S.
157, 166 (1954) (dictum).
However, it is significant to note that the Court has held that a tax on net income
is not a direct burden since it is levied only if there is a net profit; whereas taxes such
as the gross receipts tax are levied whether there is a profit or not, and hence are
considered to be direct. See United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321,
328-329 (1918).
The Supreme Court has held that states are prohibited from discriminating against
interstate commerce, directly or indirectly. See Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner Co.
v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 394 (1952); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 827 U.S. 416,
438-34 (1946); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 438-39
(1939); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra at 458
(dictum).
14. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska Bd., 347 U.S. 590, 602 (1954); Mich-
igan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, supra note 13, at 170; Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, supra note 13, at 311; Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250, 255 56 (1938); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra
note 13, at 458 (dictum).
15. In West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, aff'd pet
curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946), the California Supreme Court permitted an appor-
tioned, non-discriminatory net income tax which was attributable to the company's
local activities. However, the tax statute made no attempt to segregate the intrastate
business activities from the interstate activities of the company. By affirming this
decision, the Supreme Court may have indicated that it was no longer fearful of the
possible multiple burden on interstate commerce in the case of state net income
taxes. Finally, in Northwestern Cement the Court made its position explicit when it
stated, "Logically it is impossible, when the tax is fairly apportioned, to have the
same income taxed twice." 358 U.S. at 462.
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ment the Court rejected the "local activities" requirement and sus-
tained a non-discriminatory, apportioned state net income tax levied
on income derived from interstate commerce where the business
had, for tax purposes, established "sufficient nexus" with the taxing
state."0 The Court's reference to "sufficient nexus" 17 caused consid-
erable consternation among businessmen who feared that "sufficient
nexus" might be interpreted to include the mere solicitation of or-
ders in a state. This fear was heightened by the Supreme Court's
subsequent denials of certiorari to two state court cases decided
prior to the Court's decision in Northwestern Cement.'" In these
two cases a state court had upheld net income taxes similar to those
allowed by the Supreme Court in Northwestern Cement. However,
the local activities of the interstate businesses in these two cases
were limited to the solicitation of orders by salesmen; the activities
which the Court found to be a "sufficient nexus" in Northwestern
Cement were both the solicitation of orders by salesmen and the
maintenance of a permanent office in the taxing state.'9
The sentiments of the businessmen were more completely ex-
pressed by the proponents of the act who contended that conform-
ity to complex state tax structures and apportionment formulas un-
duly increased the cost of doing interstate business, especially for
small interstate businesses, by greatly increasing the cost of account-
16. Mr. Justice Clark stated in the majority's opinion:
We conclude that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign cor-
poration may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not discrimina-
tory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing State
forming sufficient nexus to support the same.
358 U.S. at 452.
17. Nexus is defined as a "connection or interconnection; tie; link." WEBST-M'S
NEw INTEmNA-IONAL DICTIONARY 1649 (2d ed. 1947).
18. International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of
Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959). In
both of these cases interstate businesses maintained no offices, warehouses or prop-
erty with the taxing state. In the International Shoe case the company's only activity
in the state was the regular solicitation of orders by fifteen salesmen. In the Brown-
Forman case the company's only activity in the state was the solicitation of orders by
"missionary men" who occasionally accompanied salesmen of wholesale customers
to retail stores. However, the "missionary men" solicited no orders at the retail
level. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld apportioned state net income taxes in
both cases, relying on West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d
861, aff'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
It is probable that the fact situation in the Brown-Formats case was responsible
for the inclusion of § 101(a) (2) in the act. This section allows a salesman to solicit
orders for the benefit of a customer, see note 6 supra and accompanying text. Thus,
the salesman of the Brown-Forman Company will now be able to solicit orders
from retail stores for the benefit of the company's wholesale customers, and in-
directly for the benefit of the Brown-Forman Company. The significance of these
two cases is further apparent from references to them in S. REP'. No. 658, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), quoted in U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEws, 2549 (1959).
19. See notes 13 & 18 supra.
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ing.20 Therefore, they contended, it was the duty of Congress to en-
act uniform apportionment formulas for state taxation. However,
this solution would require prolonged study if it were to be equit-
able and effective. And the proponents added that until Congress
acted, the fear of an extension of the Northwestern Cement decision
was detrimental to the interests of small businesses by discouraging
the primary method of expansion by such businesses-the efforts
of solicitors in adjoining states.21 To alleviate these fears and thus
stimulate, rather than stifle, economic development, they contended
that it was necessary for Congress to define the precise limits of the
state power to tax the income of interstate businesses.22
20. S. Ru P. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), quoted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, 2550 (1959), states:
Many small- and medium-sized firms engaged in interstate commerce are
fearful of the cost of compliance necessary to properly make such determina-
tions [the portion of the company's total taxable income that is properly ap-
portioned to the taxing state] under the laws of each of the States in which
such sales are made. This apprehension exists in large part because of the
lack of uniformity in the laws of the various States in determining taxable
income," prior to apportionment, and in the factors to be taken into account
in determining the amount of income to be apportioned to the State.
There are at least 35 States, the District of Columbia, and at least 8 cities
taxing business income, including earnings derived from interstate commerce
where there is local business activity. No two States have exactly the same
formula for apportioning the amount of income attributable to local activities
within the State. The committee understands that the formulas currently in use
are complex, that even within the formulas the meaning of the basic words are
inexact.
Many of the witnesses appearing before the committee advised the commit-
tee that they bad no objection to paying their fair share of the State tax burden,
but were concerned with the heavy cost of compliance that resulted from the
lack of uniformity mentioned above and suggested that in fact in some cases
the cost of compliance would exceed the amount of tax liability reflected on
the return.
See also the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Northwestern Cement, "The cost
of such a far-flung scheme for complying with the taxing requirements of the
different States may well exceed the burden of the taxes themselves, especially in
the case of small companies doing a small volume of business in several States." 358
U.S. at 474. But see 43 MIN. L. REv. 1010 (1959).
21. The reason for this, the proponents explained, was that the increased cost of
accounting necessary to comply with the varying state tax formulas, in addition to
the taxes themselves, would minimize the possibility of profit from such expansion
if the mere solicitation of orders constituted a "sufficient nexus" to allow state
taxation. See 105 CONG. EEc. 14991 & 14995 (daily ed. Aug. 1959); 105 CONG.
RMc. 15538-39 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1959); 105 CoNG. REc. 16303 (daily ed. Sept. 2,
1959). See also S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), quoted in U.S. CODE
CoNe. & AD. NEws, 2550-52 (1959). But see Campbell, Reactions in California to
Decisions in Northwestern Cement and Stockham Cases, quoted at 105 CONG. REc.
16350-52 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959), and statements by Representative Patman,
Chairman, Small Business Committee of the House of Representatives, at 105 CONG.
REc. 16304-05 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1959).
22. See 105 CONG. REc. 15013-14 & 15020 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter also suggested congressional action. See Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476-77 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
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The opponents of the act generally conceded that there was a
need for uniformity in state taxation of interstate commerce and
that congressional action was necessary for an adequate solution of
the problem. However, they protested that any definition of the
states' taxing power would be inadvisable until a thorough study
could be completed.24 They contended, first of all, that the act
would result in a considerable loss of tax revenue to the consumer
states2 5 which were already sorely pressed for income to finance the
ever-expanding services demanded by their citizens. 26 The oppon-
ents' fear was somewhat quelled by the passage of the Talmadge
amendment which narrowed the act by eliminating the provision
allowing interstate businesses to qualify for the act's exemption if
they maintained only a sales office in the taxing state.27 However,
they still felt that the consumer states would suffer financially if
many of the businesses which presently maintained a sales office
or property in a state adapted their operations to conform to the
act's requirements for tax exemption. In addition, they contended
that the act's exemption would, by decreasing state revenues, neces-
28. See S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (minority views) quoted
in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 2558 (1959); 105 CoNG. RMc. 15012 & 15016
(daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959); 105 CoNG. REc. 15097 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959. See also
Resolution Unanimously Adopted at the Annual Meeting of the Nat'l Ass'n of Tax
Adm'rs, Statler-Hilton Hotel, Buffalo, N.Y., July 8-11, 1959, quoted at 105 CONG.
PFc. 14992 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959); letter of United States Treasury Dep't, quoted
id. at 15003.
24. Ibid.
25. Most of the objections to the act came from representatives of the consumer
states, those states which are dependent upon the manufactured products of other
states and which have relatively few corporations incorporated or domiciled in the
state on which to levy income taxes. The minority of the Senate Finance Committee
stated:
This bill represents a part of the fight, which is even older than the Constitu-
tion, between the producing and the consuming sections of our country. Two-
thirds of the revenue collected by the various States from net income taxes on
interstate commerce is collected by 10 manufacturing States. Should this bill
be enacted into law, these States will be able to collect additional revenue at
the expense of the consuming States.
S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (minority views), quoted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NFws, 2557 (1959).
For the objections of the officials of eight states to the proposed legislation, see
105 CONG. REC. 15013 (Pennsylvania) (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959); id. at 15014-15
(Minnesota); id. at 15016 (Kansas); id. at 15018 (Michigan); 105 CONG. REc.
15098 (Georgia) (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959); id. at 15122 (North Dakota); id. at
15180 (Oregon); id. at 15181 (Wisconsin).
26. See Pierce, State Fiscal Needs and Interstate Commerce, 18 Omo ST. L.J. 43,
44-45 (1957).
27. See note 6 supra for a discussion of the effects of the Talmadge amendment.
28. For example, a company could maintain either a private long-distance tele-
phone line or tefetype communication with salesmen and customers within a state. In
this way, the company could maintain close and constant contacts without a sales
office, and thereby conform to the act's requirements with little inconvenience or
loss of business.
sarily increase the tax burden on local intrastate business; further,
the act would be an incentive to large businesses to extend their
sales activities, thereby increasing competition at the local level to
the detriment of small business. 29 The opponents also pointed out
that the act was not a temporary or stop-gap measure as the pro-
ponents contended, for if no permanent solution were found, the act
might be in effect indefinitely since no termination date was
provided. 0
Although the precise effects of the act cannot be measured at this
time, it is possible to consider and analyze the more important ques-
tions presented by the act. The most immediate and important of
these questions is the act's effect on the prior law of state taxation
of interstate commerce as formulated by the Supreme Court."1 The
proponents of the final bill were careful to point out that the act
would not overrule any previous decisions of the court as the original
bill was intended to do, and the holding of the Court in North-
western Cement would not be affected, since the decision was based
on the presence of the company's sales office in the taxing state.
32
Neither will the act work any changes in the Court's decisions with
regard to other forms of state taxation of interstate or intrastate
businesses, for example, sales, use and property taxes; nor will the
act affect state taxes on businesses which are engaged in foreign
commerce.3 3 Rather, the act "draws the line" at the Courts holding in
Northwestern Cement 34 and prevents the states and the Court from
further extending state power to impose net income taxes on busi-
nesses whose only nexus with a state is the presence of salesmen
29. See S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (minority views), quoted
in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 2558 (1959). See also 105 CONG. REC. 15003 &
15012 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959); 105 CONG. REo. 15098 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959);
105 CONG. REC. 16304 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1959).
80. The Sparkman amendment, to provide a termination date for the statute, (see
105 CoNG. REc. 15121 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959)), was defeated by the Senate, id.
at 15125.
31. See generally text and articles cited note 11 supra for a summary of the
judicial history of state taxation of interstate commerce. See also notes 13 & 14 supra
and accompanying text for a summary of some of the leading Supreme Court cases
on state taxation of interstate commerce.
32. Compare S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), quoted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, 2550-51 (1959), and statements of Senator Byrd of Virginia at
105 CONG. PEc. 14990 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959), made prior to the passage of the
Talmadge amendment, with statements at 105 CONG. REc. 16303 & 16305 (daily
ed. Sept. 2, 1959) and 105 CONG. REc. 16349 & 16353 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959),
made after the adoption of the Talmadge amendment.
33. Senator Bennett, one of the proponents of the statute, stated during the early
debates on the original bill: "Ibis bill does not affect in any way the power of a
State to impose sales taxes, property taxes, licenses, any form of tax, except a tax
on the income of the foreign corporation." 105 CONG. EEC. 14997 (daily ed. Aug.
19, 1959).
34. See the statements of Senator Sparkman at 105 CONG. REc. 16352 (daily ed.
Sept. 3, 1959).
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soliciting orders for acceptance outside the state. Thus, the act
merely defines the minimum activities required for exemption and
clarifies, rather than rejects, the Court's previous decisions.
Two further questions are raised by the act: What persons and
businesses may take advantage of the exemption defined by the act?
What must such persons and businesses do to come within the act's
exemption? Since the act does not make any distinctions as to the
size or type of business,8 5 it is clear that any person or business en-
gaged in interstate commerce may avail itself of the act's exemption
by meeting its specific requirements. 36 The act does, however, limit
its exemption to businesses not incorporated in and persons neither
residents of nor domiciled in the taxing state.37 Further, such busi-
nesses and persons must limit their activities within the state to the
solicitation of orders by salesmen for the sale of tangible property
or to the solicitation of orders or the sale of tangible personal prop-
erty by independent contractors on behalf of several such persons
or companies. 88
Thus, the general requirements of the act are clear, but, in many
cases, f er interpretation of the act may be necessary to assure
precise compliance. Two terms in the act, "the solicitation of orders"
and "tangible personal property," may present difficulty in interpre-
tation and application. Although the act does not precisely define
"the solicitation of orders," the committee reports and congression-
al debates3 9 indicate that the proponents of the final bill defi-
nitely considered that a warehouse, stock of goods or sales office in
35. Senator Long proposed an amendment which, as modified, provided:
(e) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any
person for any taxable year, if the sales of such person in such State during
such taxable year are less than $250,000.
105 CONG. BEc. 15129 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959). However, this amendment was
rejected by the Senate, 105 CONG. REc. 15131 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959).
36. See text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
37. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
38. See note 41 infra and accompanying text.
39. See generaly 105 CONG. REc. 14989-15004, 15011-23 (daily ed. Aug. 19,
1959); 105 CONG. EReC. 15097-15107, 15108-35 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959); 105
CoNG. REc. 15538-41 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1959); 105 CONG. REC. 16096-97 (daily
ed. Sept. 1, 1959); 105 CONG. REc. 16302-08 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1959); 105 CONG.
REc. 16347-54 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959); S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959), quoted in U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws, 2548-59 (1959); CoNr. l E'. No.
1103, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), quoted id. at 2560. For a more limited account,
see XVII CONG. QuAn. 1095, 1123, 1163, 1199, 1284-35.
The Court frequently consults the legislative history of a statute for clarification,
see, e.g., The Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958); Offutt Hous-
ing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253, 260 (1956); United States v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315-16 (1953); United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit
Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222-24 (1952); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 337-38
(1950). The Court has even considered the legislative background of a statute, see
e.g., United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575-89 (1957).
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the state would be more than "the solicitation of orders." 4 0 But, the
legislative history does indicate that the act was intended to permit
a company to have either itinerant salesmen or permanent sales rep-
resentatives in a state without being subject to state net income tax-
ation.4 ' It is probable that these agents would be permitted to rent
temporary quarters to display their merchandise; however, they
could maintain no permanent office or display facilities or service
orders after acceptance, if their employers wished to remain within
the act's exemption.42
The second term in the act which may raise some interpretative
problems is "tangible personal property." The act does not attempt
to define "tangible personal property," and the history of the act
indicates only that Congress definitely intended to exclude from the
definition, and hence from the exemption, insurance contracts and
the premiums thereon,43 and the sale of personal services.44 Since
the history of the act contains nothing which indicates that Con-
gress intended either an unusually broad or a restrictive application
of the term, it is probable that Congress intended the ordinary
meaning of the term "tangible personal property," that is, property
"capable of being touched." 45
40. See 105 CONG. REC. 16303 & 16306 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1959) (House debates);
105 CONG. PEc. 16350 & 16352 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959) (Senate debates).
Incidental property which is allowed would probably include, for example, mer-
chandise samples carried by a salesman and an automobile for the use of a com-
pany's salesmen.
41. See CoNF. REP. No. 1103, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), quoted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 2560 (1959); 105 CONG. B~c. 16303 (daily ed. Sept. 2,
1959) (House debates); 105 CONG. REc. 16348 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959) (Senate
debates).
42. It is the permanent nature of a warehouse or sales office that is objectionable.
See note 41 supra and accompanying text. The reason for this is that these facilities
require an expenditure by the state for public services such as police and fire pro-
tection. Ordinarly a temporary activity would not unduly increase the need for such
services.
Another problem which may be raised by the term "solicitation of orders ...
which are sent outside the State for approval or rejection" is a problem of contract
law, to determine when an order or offer is made and when and where it is accepted.
This problem was explained by Senator Byrd of Virginia as requiring the contract
to be concluded in the state of acceptance, although the act does not require title
to the goods to pass within the state of acceptance. See 105 CONG. REc. 16349 (daily
ed. Sep. 3, 1959). Thus, it is probable that general principles of contract law will
be determinative in resolving the question of when and where the order is accepted.
See generally Coanm, CoN'racrs §§ 24 & 88 (1950) for the applicable rules of
contract law.
43. See 105 CONG. REc. 14991 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1959).
44. See 105 CONG. Ec. 15101 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959).
45. BLAci, LAw DICTIoNARY 1627 (4th ed. 1951). See also BLACK, LAW Drc-
TioNARY 1152 (1st ed. 1891); WEBsTEa's Nw INTERNTONAL DICTIONARY 2577
(2d ed. 1947). For the judicial definition of this term, see e.g., Jones v. H.D. &
J.K. Crosswell, Inc., 60 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1932) (interpretation of the Revenue
Act of 1918); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 62. F. Supp. 876, 885 (Ct. CL
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While the act clarifies the previous law and eliminates the doubts
of business, it also blueprints the means for a business to accomplish
considerable savings in accounting costs and to avoid state net income
taxes. It cannot be overlooked that the resultant financial losses to
the consumer states must be regained, if possible, by other means.
Thia leads to yet another important question raised by the act -the
ability of the consumer states to recoup any financial losses occa-
sioned by the act.
Several alternatives are available to the consumer states to recoup
their lost revenue. It is, of course, possible for a state to increase the
rates of the present tax structure or to impose new forms of taxes on
the state's present taxpayers. A more desirable alternative for a state
would be to levy new forms of taxes on those businesses now exempt
from the state's net income taxes.46 However, if the only contact of
an interstate business is the presence of salesmen soliciting orders
in a state, the Supreme Court has held that few other forms of
state taxation of such a business are permitted by the commerce
clause:4T And none of the permitted forms of taxation would be
sufficiently remunerative to be an adequate substitute for the net
1945) (interpretation of the Revenue Act of 1918); State v. Jones, 60 Ariz. 380, 137
P.2d 970 (1943) (state sales tax). For the judicial application of this term, based
on legislative intent, see, e.g., State v. Advertiser Co., 257 Ala. 423, 59 So. 2d 576
(1952) (court assumed that the ordinary meaning of the term was intended by the
legislature); Green v. Reed Constr. Corp., 91 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1956) (court assumed
that the ordinary meaning of the term was intended by the legislature); Farrand
Coal Co. v. Halpin, 10 Ill. 2d 507, 140 N.E.2d 698 (1957) (court assumed that the
ordinary meaning of the term was intended by the legislature); People ex rel.
Terminals & Transp. Corp. of America v. State Tax Comm'n, 229 App. Div. 289,
241 N.Y.S. 38 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 254 N.Y. 401, 173 N.E. 562 (Ct. App. 1930) (the
court of appeals assumed that the ordinary meaning of the term was intended by
the legislature); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commn., 326 P.2d 821,
823 (Okla. 1958) (court held that the legislature intended a broad application of a
sales tax statute).
46. It would not be contrary to the intent of Congress to substitute new forms
of taxes on these businesses. Furthermore, it is quite evident from the legislative
history of the act that businesses did not object to paying a fair share of taxes.
Rather, they objected to taxes which required costly compliance in the conformity
to such taxes. See note 20 supra.
47. A gross receipts tax on an interstate company whose activities are thus limited
is invalid. See Norton v. Department of Revenue, 840 U.S. 534, 537 (1951) (citing
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 329 (1944)). In Norton the Court
stated, "This corporation could have approached the Illinois market through solicitors
only and it would have been entitlted to the immunity of interstate commerce as set
out in the Dilworth case." Id. at 538 (dictum). See also id. at 539 (dictum); Joseph
v. Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 429 (1947); Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249 (1946). In the Carter case a gross receipts tax on the essential in-
cidents of interstate commerce was held invalid. In the Hewit case a gross receipts
tax on an interstate sale was held invalid.
A license tax on soliciters of an interstate business has also been held invalid.
Nippert v. City of Richmond, 827 U.S. 416 (1946); Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
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income tax 8.4 It might be possible to tax the incidents of the busi-
nesses' activity within the state-the retail sale of goods and the
solicitation of orders. However, except in a limited number of cases,
an exempt business will not make sales within the state49 and it has
been held that a retail sales tax may not be imposed on a solicited
order which is accepted in another state. 0
The use tax, levied on goods brought into the taxing state,51 would
be a practical means by which a state might obtain tax revenue from
transactions conducted in accordance with the act's defined require-
ments for exemption. By levying a use tax, a consumer state may re-
gain much of its lost revenue. However, the use tax has a significant
disadvantage for some states. Although the question has not been
48. A property tax on the property of an interstate business has been held valid,
however. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944). See also 43 MIN. L.
REv. 1015 (1959). However, a property tax would be an impractical alternative
since an interstate company, to conform to the acts exemption, will have no more
than incidental property within a state. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
49. The act does permit an interstate business to employ an unlimited number
of independent contractors in a state and yet qualify for the act's exemption. These
independent contractors are permitted to make sales as well as solicit orders. See
note 7 supra. Therefore, a state could levy a retail sales tax on those sales made in
the state by such independent contractors. However, it is possible that, because of
this fact, the number of sales so made would be small.
50. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944). In Dilworth
the Court held that a state sales tax was invalid where title to the goods was found
to have passed outside the taxing state. The act does not require that title to the
goods pass outside the taxing state, but requires only that the order be accepted out-
side the taxing state. See note 41 supra. However, it is probable that, if the only
activity of a company within a state is the solicitation of orders, a state determina-
tion that title to the goods passed within the taxing state would not be sufficient to
allow a state sales tax. In McGoldrick v. Berwin-White Coal Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940),
the Court upheld a sales tax on a sales made within the state by an interstate com-
pany. However, in the Berwin-White case the determination of the place of sale
was based on the fact that the company maintained an office and accepted orders
in the taxing state. Id. at 44. Thus, it is probable that such a state determination of
the place of sale, without a similar factual basis, would be invalid. It is also prob-
able that a comparable factual basis would not exist in the case of an interstate
company seeking the acts exemption. See note 28 supra.
51. The use tax is levied on the privilege of the use or consumption of personal
property within a state. It is generally levied in conjunction with a state retail sales
tax and, in such cases, is intended to prevent avoidance of the state sales tax by
out-of-state purchases. The Supreme Court has held the use tax to be constitutional.
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). The Court has also held that
a state may require out-of-state sellers to collect the use tax on goods which are
sent into the state by the company in accordance with orders solicited by the com-
pany's salesmen in the taxing state. See, e.g., General Trading Co. v. Commissioner,
322 U.S. 335 (1944).
See also Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 105 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1958), aff'd 28 U.S.L. Whim
4191 (U.S. March 21, 1960), where the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed a state court determination that Florida could validly require a Georgia
dealer, selling its products in Florida through wholesale jobbers, to collect and remit
a Florida use tax.
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resolved by the Court, it is probable that the use tax may be levied
only in conjunction with an equal tax on sales made within the
state.52 Thus, those states which do not presently levy a sales tax
would be forced to enact one, if they choose to adopt the use tax
alternative. However, only the legislature of a state may select and
impose new taxes such as the sales and use tax, and since the legisla-
tures of a majority of the states will not be in general session un-
til 1961,13 most consumer states will have no alternative but to suf-
fer the consequent loss of tax revenue, at least until 1961. But, it
would seem advisable for the state legislatures to postpone the en-
actment of any of these alternatives until the designated commit-
tees have submitted to Congress proposed uniform standards for
state taxation of interstate commerce. 4
It is probable that the act will produce both the results desired by
the proponents and those feared by the opponents. Generally, by
defining the taxing power of the states, the act will stimulate the
economic development of small interstate businesses as the propon-
ents desired. However, as the opponents feared, the act will also be
of benefit to large corporations, thereby increasing competition at
the local level. In addition, some consumer states will suffer a loss
of tax revenue as large and small businesses adapt their operations
to conform to the act's exemption.5
It is undeniably the duty of Congress to balance the interests of
the states and the interests of the nation, and it is unquestionably
the right of Congress to define the taxing power of the states with
regard to interstate commerce. However, the Interstate Commerce
Tax Exemption Act neither properly balances these interests nor
adequately defines the states' power. The act's definition of the
states' power adds little to the previous law as developed by 'he
Supreme Court and may result in additional litigation as businesses
attempt to put themselves within the act's exemption. Further, the
52. A tax levied on goods purchased outside the state, without an equal tax on
goods sold within the state would probably be considered discriminatory by the
Court and hence invalid. See cases cited note 13 supra.
53. This was pointed out by Senator McCarthy at 105 CoNNc. RFc. 15016 (daily
ed. Aug. 19, 1959).
54. However, the act does not require the designated committees to submit pro-
posed legislation to Congress until July 1, 1962. Section 302, 73 Stat. 555 (1959)
(U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 614 (1959)). Thus, the states would be forced to
wait until 1963 to enact legislation.
Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
reports that no action has as yet been taken by that committee. Letter from Senator
Harry Byrd to Minnesota Law Review, March 22, 1960.
55. It is difficult to determine how many of the consumer states applied their
income tax laws to interstate businesses prior to Northwestern Cement. However,
it is certain that, but for the act, all such states would have taxed interstate busi-
nesses after Northwestern Cement.
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balancing of the conflicting interests was apparently done with in-
adequate concern for the vital interests of the states. Obviously the
act was the result of haste and compromise; insufficient considera-
tion was given to the entire problem of state taxation of interstate
commerce in an attempt to provide an immediate solution to the
problems of small business. However, the act is at least the first step
toward a uniform system of state taxation of interstate commerce,
and a uniform system, if found, will be beneficial to all interests
affected.

